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Abstract 
We investigate the effectiveness of initiating deposit insurance at the outset of a banking crisis. 
Using a conjoint analysis approach that allows us to consider the simultaneous impact of 
multiple deposit insurance attributes and various counterfactuals, we ask a multinational sample 
of respondents how they would view hypothetical account profiles following the failure of a 
large competing bank. Previous experience matters: respondents from countries without explicit 
deposit insurance exhibit greater withdrawal risk, suggesting that the introduction of deposit 
insurance during a crisis may be only partially successful in preventing bank runs. They also 
impose a higher deposit interest rate premium. Having a long-term bank relationship reduces 
withdrawal risk, as does the absence of co-insurance. 
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THE IMPACT OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE ON DEPOSITOR BEHAVIOR DURING A 
CRISIS: A CONJOINT ANALYSIS APPROACH 
1. Introduction 
The theoretical advantages and disadvantages of deposit insurance are well known. On the one 
hand, it provides depositors with confidence about the safety of their funds and hence reduces the 
likelihood of bank runs following an adverse event. On the other hand, it encourages depositors 
to scale back on their monitoring of bank risk-taking activities during non-crisis periods, thus 
making future bank failures more likely.1 In line with the first argument, Demirgüc-Kunt et al. 
(2014) point out that countries with explicit deposit insurance schemes in place prior to the 2007-
08 global financial crisis saw very few depositor-led bank runs, but a widespread incidence of 
runs on (uninsured) wholesale funding. At the same time, they also express disquiet about the 
long-term moral hazard implications of this success. 
Most empirical research on deposit insurance has focused on existing insurance schemes, 
either by comparing insured and uninsured countries, or by comparing insured and uninsured 
depositors within the same country. By contrast, deposit insurance that is introduced during a 
crisis appears to have attracted little research interest to date.2  A natural question is whether 
such interventions work in the desired manner.  That is, can the introduction of deposit insurance 
during a crisis be effective in mitigating depositor runs? 
Given the potential moral hazard and adverse selection costs of deposit insurance, many 
countries delay the introduction of deposit insurance until a banking crisis strikes.3  However, 
such a strategy implicitly assumes that newly-introduced insurance is just as effective in 
                                                 
1  As pointed out by an associate editor, this occurs not only because of the well known moral hazard problem, but 
also because of adverse selection: any insurance-induced reduction in market discipline allows incompetent and 
inefficient bankers to continue to operate.  
2  Anginer et al. (2012) point out that “(T)here is no study that examines the impact of deposit insurance…during a 
period of global risk and instability. This is an important gap in our knowledge…” 
3  See Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008). 
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preventing bank runs as long-standing insurance. Perhaps it takes time for depositors to learn 
about, and gain confidence in, explicit deposit insurance schemes. In that case, deposit insurance 
introduced following the onset of a crisis may be of limited value compared to the pre-existing 
kind. 
In this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of explicit deposit insurance that is 
introduced when banking sector problems arise.  The usual approach for doing so would 
compare the actual crisis experiences of countries that had a pre-existing deposit insurance 
system with those that introduced deposit insurance only once the crisis was underway. 
Unfortunately, because these countries also differ along a multitude of other dimensions (e.g., 
deposit insurance systems with widely varying features, different forms of crisis, and so on), 
implementation of this approach would be a daunting task.4 Instead, we employ conjoint analysis 
and ask a sample of respondents to assess a number of hypothetical deposit accounts, all of 
which are insured to varying degrees, in the presence of a banking sector crisis. Because our 
sample includes respondents both from (i) countries that have explicit deposit insurance and (ii) 
countries that do not have such insurance, we are able to use the collected responses to gain 
insight into the potential effectiveness of crisis-adopted deposit insurance. 
Our main finding is that respondents from countries without explicit deposit insurance 
behave differently. In particular, they exhibit greater withdrawal risk, suggesting that the 
introduction of deposit insurance during a crisis may be only partially successful in preventing 
bank runs. More generous insurance schemes are more effective but potentially involve greater 
long-term system risks. Newly-insured respondents also require a higher interest rate premium 
than their historically-insured counterparts, although there is no difference between the two 
groups in their pricing of bank risk. 
                                                 
4   As countries typically only adopt deposit insurance once, such an approach would also have limited data 
observations relative to the number of potential variations. 
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Many papers have been written about deposit insurance, but ours is the first to examine 
its introduction during a banking sector crisis and assess its impact using conjoint analysis. This 
allows us to extend several strands of recent research. For example, Osili and Paulson (2014) 
find that immigrants from countries with deposit insurance schemes are more likely to use the 
United States banking system, from which they conjecture that insurance can 
potentially maintain confidence during a crisis.  Our results confirm this conjecture, while at the 
same time clarifying which deposit insurance characteristics are most important for depositor 
confidence. In the paper that is perhaps most similar in spirit to ours, Karas et al. (2013) compare 
the reactions of newly-insured and uninsured depositors to a 2004 minor panic in the Russian 
banking sector; in a related manner, our study attempts to compare the reactions of newly-
insured and historically-insured depositors to a hypothetical crisis that allows for a wider range 
of deposit insurance features and depositor attributes, and for consideration of counter-factual 
events. Overall, our quasi-experimental approach provides a fresh perspective on a well-travelled 
area by allowing us to ask new questions and re-investigate old answers.  While not a substitute 
for traditional methods, such an approach is obviously complementary. And, as we illustrate, it 
can be particularly valuable in situations where traditional methods are difficult to apply. 
The next section describes our research design in more detail and provides a preliminary 
analysis of the collected data. Section 3 outlines the econometric model and its estimation, while 
section 4 contains the main results. Section 5 discusses some limitations of our study and 
suggests several interesting directions for future research.  
 
2. Research Design and Data Collection 
Our analytical approach is straightforward. First, we use conjoint analysis to collect data on 
depositor responses to a hypothetical bank crisis. Second, we investigate whether these responses 
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are systematically related to deposit insurance features and respondent characteristics.  
As described by Louviere (1988), conjoint analysis requires respondents to make 
judgments about criterion variables based on a series of hypothetical profiles with varying 
attributes, thus enabling the underlying structure of their cognitive mental models to be 
statistically inferred from, for example, regression models. In our case, the hypothetical profiles 
are bank deposit accounts and the attributes describe bank and deposit risk, and features of the 
deposit insurance system.  
This approach is similar to an experimental design, insofar as the situations presented to 
respondents are hypothetical, and has several advantages over a traditional survey. First, it is less 
susceptible to “social desirability” and “retrospection” biases: because the situations are 
hypothetical, respondents need not be swayed by the possible social consequences of their crisis-
induced behavior or suffer from recall difficulties. Second, it allows us to investigate how 
depositors trade off different deposit insurance features of our choosing. For example, a 
traditional survey would allow us to ask only what actions depositors took during the crisis given 
the deposit insurance system in place at that time. By contrast, our approach allows us to ask 
what actions they would have taken under different insurance scenarios. 
 
2.1. Deposit account profiles and attributes 
Based on work by Garcia (2000), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004), Iyer and Puri (2012), 
Kiss et al. (2012), Iyer at al. (2013), and Karas et al. (2013), we assign seven attributes to each 
hypothetical account profile: maximum deposit insurance coverage per deposit ($250,000 or 
$50,000), deposit size (above or below the maximum deposit insurance coverage), co-insurance 
provision (100% or 75% guarantee), bank capital buffer level (above or below average), pre-
funding of deposit insurance (yes or no), deposit insurance premium type (risk-adjusted or flat-
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rate), and insurance fund membership by banks (compulsory or voluntary).  From these, we 
create eight conjoint profiles that contain various combinations of these attributes.5  
 
2.2. Respondent sample and data collection  
Our sample of respondents consists of 349 business school students at universities in Europe 
(132 students), New Zealand (122), and the United States (95). There are always pros and cons 
associated with the use of student respondents, and our study is no exception. On the one hand, 
focusing on students allows us to more easily construct a multinational sample containing 
respondents both from countries with explicit deposit insurance and from countries without such 
insurance. In addition, business students are likely to have a relatively good understanding of 
risk-return trade-offs. On the other hand, most students are younger and poorer, have more 
limited life experience, and are less likely to have experienced a crisis first-hand than the typical 
depositor. For these reasons, some caution must be applied when trying to generalize from our 
student sample to the depositor population. 
Another important issue for policy conclusions is the extent to which our student 
respondents are likely to have had a reasonable understanding of deposit insurance; without such 
an understanding, their answers may be nothing more than guesswork and hence of little value. 
To address this issue, we re-sampled the same student populations (since the original respondents 
would have become aware of deposit insurance via their previous participation) to obtain 
information about their knowledge of deposit insurance. These new samples (140 responses in 
total: 55 from the United States, 52 from New Zealand, and 23 from Europe) were asked about 
the safety of a $120,000 deposit in the event of a bank failure and a $100,000 coverage limit. 
                                                 
5   A description of the profiles, instructions to respondents, and other data collection details appear in a    
Supplementary Online Appendix (SOA), available at http://www.econ.iastate.edu/~oz9a/research/files/ 
SOA_BoyleEtAl_DepIns_Jan2015.pdf. 
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Ninety-one percent of those surveyed answered the question correctly, with no discernible 
difference between students from countries with explicit deposit insurance and those from 
countries without it. This result means we can be reasonably confident that our respondent 
sample was familiar with the concept of deposit insurance. More generally, the high, and 
homogeneous, awareness of deposit insurance suggests that most countries have, directly or 
indirectly, been fairly successful in educating depositors about fundamental deposit insurance 
principles, and that such awareness need not require first-hand experience of a banking crisis. 
Our data collection commenced with respondents being told that one of the two largest 
banks in their country had just failed, and that they would be asked to consider the implications 
of this event for interest-bearing deposit accounts at their own bank. In order to ensure that they 
had a common information base, and to keep the number of variables used in the subsequent 
analysis at a manageable level, all respondents were instructed that their deposit was at least 
partially covered by a fully-credible deposit insurance agency, and that their bank held a 
diversified portfolio of assets but was not considered “too big to fail.” They were also told that 
their bank had no government ownership and no higher-priority securities, and that they 
themselves held no deposits at other banks. 
Respondents reported several personal characteristics: gender, whether they had had an 
actual bank account for five years or more, whether they opened this account following advice 
from another customer, and whether they had other bank relationships (such as a loan) in 
addition to this account. Most importantly, they were asked to identify their home country. Our 
respondents originate from a wide range of countries: Austria, China, Egypt, Finland, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Russia, Slovakia, South 
Korea, Sri-Lanka, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom, and USA. Crucially, three countries 
on the list—China, Egypt, and New Zealand—do not have explicit deposit insurance schemes. 
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This feature of the data allows us to compare the reaction to a bank failure of respondents 
originating from countries without explicit deposit insurance to that of respondents from 
countries with such insurance. 
Respondents were also asked to assess two statements designed to elicit information 
about their risk preferences: 
Risk Tradeoff Statement: “I am willing to take high financial risks in order to realize higher 
average yields;”  
Risk Tolerance Statement: “I usually view myself as a risk taker.” 
Respondents indicated the degree of agreement (or disagreement) with these statements, based 
on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7). 
Although the sample correlation between the responses to these two statements is strongly 
positive (0.61; std. error = 0.03), it is also significantly less than one, suggesting that the two 
statements capture different aspects of risk preferences. 
Table 1 presents the definitions of the account and respondent characteristics, and the 
terminology used to identify them throughout the remainder of this paper. For the two risk 
preference statements, we anticipate our subsequent regression analysis and combine the 
“strongly disagree” and “disagree” responses into one category; we do the same for the “strongly 
agree” and “agree” responses. 
 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 provides selected summary statistics for the respondent variables and compares 
characteristics of two subsamples—respondents originating from countries that have explicit 
deposit insurance and those from countries that do not. Respondents in the latter group are 
significantly less likely to have had an actual bank account for five or more years and to have 
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multiple bank relationships, but are more likely to have opened the account on another 
customer’s advice. However, Table 2 reveals little evidence of any difference in risk preferences 
across the two groups. A Pearson χ2 test cannot reject the hypothesis that the distribution of 
respondent risk preferences in our sample is unaffected by prior exposure to deposit insurance.6 
 
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
2.3. Preliminary analysis 
For each account profile, respondents were asked two questions about their reaction to news of 
the bank failure: 
Question 1: “Compared to competing financial institutions, I would expect an annualized 
interest rate for this account to be…” The response options are categorical on a nine-point scale, 
ranging from “significantly lower” (1) to “significantly higher” (9).  
Question 2: “On hearing about the news of the shock to the financial system, what percentage of 
your deposit are you likely to immediately withdraw?” The response options are arranged in 11 
steps from 0% to 100%, with a step size of 10%.7  
Tables 3 and 4 present the distribution of responses to these two questions, pooled across 
the eight account profiles. For the full sample, the interest premium responses are largely 
symmetric around the middle of the response scale while the deposit withdrawal responses are 
concentrated in the 50% or below range. More interesting are the differences between the 
respondents whose home countries do and do not have explicit deposit insurance. The latter 
group is more likely to require a higher interest premium and to withdraw 50% or more of their 
                                                 
6  Given a null of independence, the p-value is 0.51 for the risk tradeoff statement and 0.20 for the risk tolerance 
statement. 
7  For both questions, the response options were chosen so as to extract maximum information while minimizing the 
potential for non-response risk due to respondent fatigue.  
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deposit following the news of a major bank failure. Also, Pearson χ2 tests strongly reject equality 
of the response distributions between the respondent groups, suggesting that depositor reactions 
to a bank failure may depend on prior exposure to deposit insurance. 
 
 [Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
 
3. Empirical Model and Estimation Approach 
Tables 3 and 4 suggest that depositors with prior exposure to deposit insurance are less likely to 
respond negatively (i.e., require a higher interest rate or withdraw a significant percentage of 
their deposit) to news about a major bank failure than those without such exposure. Why might 
this be the case? One possibility is that different economic experiences affect the views and 
behavior of economic agents—see Osili and Paulson (2014). It could be, for example, that 
respondents from countries with explicit deposit insurance have different a priori beliefs, based 
on different life experiences with depositor protection schemes and banking systems generally, 
about the safety of bank deposits and the effectiveness of deposit insurance. However, Table 2 
shows that such respondents also differ in terms of other factors that could potentially affect the 
reaction to the bank failure news. For example, they are more likely to have had a long-term 
relationship with their bank, which could make deposit withdrawal less likely (Iyer and Puri, 
2012). Moreover, and importantly, the effect of prior deposit insurance exposure on responses 
may itself be influenced by specific deposit insurance features (such as the maximum coverage 
limit, co-insurance, and other account profile attributes). To disentangle these various effects, we 
turn to multivariate regression methods. 
Doing so, however, is by no means straightforward. First, the data generated by the two 
response questions are not numerical. Second, the 16 answers provided by each respondent are 
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unlikely to be independent due to unobservable respondent-specific factors. Third, common 
unobservable factors are likely to induce correlation between the answers to the interest premium 
and deposit withdrawal questions. Our econometric approach aims to address these issues. 8  
Specifically, we estimate the following system of equations: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ =  𝜃𝜃𝜋𝜋 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 +  𝒑𝒑𝑖𝑖′ ∙ 𝜶𝜶𝜋𝜋 +  𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝒑𝒑𝑖𝑖′ ∙ 𝜷𝜷𝜋𝜋 +  𝒛𝒛𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖′ ∙ 𝜸𝜸𝜋𝜋 +  𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖′ ∙ 𝜿𝜿𝜋𝜋  +  𝜆𝜆𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, (3) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ =  𝜃𝜃𝑤𝑤 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 +  𝒑𝒑𝑖𝑖′ ∙ 𝜶𝜶𝑤𝑤 +  𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝒑𝒑𝑖𝑖′ ∙ 𝜷𝜷𝑤𝑤  +  𝒛𝒛𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖′ ∙ 𝜸𝜸𝑤𝑤 + 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖′ ∙ 𝜿𝜿𝑤𝑤+ 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ∙ 𝛿𝛿𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, (4) 
where 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  is a latent variable (see Maddala, 1983) for respondent 𝑖𝑖 ’s answer to the interest 
premium question for account profile 𝑗𝑗 (where 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,…,349 and 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2,…,8), 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  is a latent 
variable for respondent 𝑖𝑖’s answer to the deposit withdrawal question for account profile 𝑗𝑗, 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖  = 
1 if and only if respondent 𝑖𝑖’s home country does not have explicit deposit insurance, 𝒑𝒑𝑖𝑖 is the 
vector of dummy variables representing account profile attributes, 𝒛𝒛𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 is the vector of dummy 
variables representing the response to the risk tradeoff statement, 𝒛𝒛𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 is the vector of dummy 
variables representing the response to the risk tolerance statement, and 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖 is the vector of the 
remaining respondent-characteristic variables appearing in Table 1. The terms 𝜆𝜆𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖  and 𝜆𝜆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 
account for unobservable respondent-specific factors that do not vary across the eight account 
profiles. Such factors may include respondent views regarding interest rates (i.e., reflecting inter-
temporal consumption substitution), respondent interpretation of the deposit withdrawal 
question, and so on. Because 𝜆𝜆𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 and 𝜆𝜆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 imply dependence of the unobserved determinants of 
respondent 𝑖𝑖’s answers across the eight account profiles, we estimate our econometric model by 
maximum likelihood, while expressing the likelihood contribution of a respondent as the joint 
probability of all 16 interest premium and deposit withdrawal answers. 
We include 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  on the right hand side of Eq. (4) due to possible feedback between a 
respondent’s choice of interest premium and withdrawal rate. For example, the withdrawal rate 
                                                 
8  Details on the model estimation, as well as additional results, appear in the SOA. 
  11 
for a particular account profile may be low if the respondent has indicated a high expected 
interest premium. We also allow this feedback effect to vary depending on whether or not the 
respondent originated from a country with explicit deposit insurance: 
 𝛿𝛿𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿𝑤𝑤 + ∆𝑤𝑤 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖. (5) 
The underlying intuition of the system modeled by Eqs. (3) and (4) is straightforward. 
Upon learning about a major bank failure, and hence of the potential for a banking sector crisis, a 
respondent first decides on the interest premium required on his deposit (Eq. (3)). Then, taking 
this interest premium into account, he chooses how much of the deposit to withdraw (Eq. (4)). 
While conceptually necessary, the inclusion of 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  in Eq. (4) creates a potential endogeneity 
problem. To obtain consistent parameter estimates, we follow the conventional “exclusion 
restriction” approach outlined by Greene (2012, Ch. 10) for systems of simultaneous equations.9 
This approach requires an explanatory variable that affects 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ , but has no direct impact on the 
conditional expectation of 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  given 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  and other explanatory variables from Eq. (4). 
We adopt an exclusion restriction based on responses to the risk preference statements. 
Recall that the first of these statements (“I am willing to take high financial risks in order to 
realize higher average yields”) asks respondents about their willingness to trade off risk and 
return while the second (“I usually view myself as a risk taker”) asks about their willingness to 
tolerate risk in general. Although the two statements obviously pick up similar respondent 
characteristics, the first has most direct relevance for interest premium setting while the second is 
more closely linked to withdrawal risk. Thus, once the direct effects of the interest premium 
(𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ) and risk tolerance (𝒛𝒛𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖) on withdrawal (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ) are accounted for, it seems reasonable to 
assume that risk tradeoff propensity (𝒛𝒛𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) provides no additional information about withdrawal 
                                                 
9 See Maddala and Lee (1976) for a discussion of the latent variable case. 
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risk.10 That is, 𝒛𝒛𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  serves as a vector of instruments for 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  and hence satisfies the exclusion 
restriction.  
Of particular interest in Eqs. (3)–(4) are the estimates of 𝜃𝜃𝜋𝜋,𝜃𝜃𝑤𝑤,𝜷𝜷𝜋𝜋, and 𝜷𝜷𝑤𝑤  as these 
reflect differences in responses attributable to variation in prior exposure to deposit insurance. 
Recall that we distinguish between respondents whose home country offers explicit deposit 
insurance and those whose home country provides no such protection. Since all our hypothetical 
account profiles offer deposit insurance, we can think of the two respondent groups as 
representing “historically-insured” and “newly-insured” depositors respectively. Thus, the 
estimates of 𝜃𝜃𝜋𝜋,𝜃𝜃𝑤𝑤 ,𝜷𝜷𝜋𝜋,  and 𝜷𝜷𝑤𝑤  can shed light on the effectiveness of introducing deposit 
insurance during a crisis. 
 
4. Regression Model Results 
The results from estimating the system of Eqs. (3) and (4) appear in Table 5. From a policy 
perspective, our primary interest is in the extent to which the effectiveness of deposit insurance 
depends on prior insurance exposure. Regardless of respondent background, deposit insurance 
seems to matter: deposits with an uninsured component (“large deposits,” i.e., those above the 
coverage limit) require a significantly higher interest rate and have an excess withdrawal rate of 
more than 20 percentage points.11 However, the overall effectiveness of deposit insurance in 
mitigating withdrawal risk depends on respondents’ country of origin. From the first row of 
Table 5, we see that the average small deposit withdrawal rate is 33.62 percentage points greater 
among newly-insured respondents than it is among historically-insured respondents, a difference 
that is statistically significant at the 1% level. For large deposits, the difference is 24.72 (= 33.62 
                                                 
10 More formally, we assume that 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  is conditionally mean-independent of 𝒛𝒛𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖; see Manski and Pepper (2000, p. 
998). 
11 From the third column of Table 5, the estimated withdrawal rate for large deposits is 31.66% among historically-
insured respondents and (31.66 − 8.90) = 22.76% among newly-insured respondents.  
  13 
– 8.90) percentage points. These results suggest that the introduction of deposit insurance during 
a crisis may be less successful than an already-existing insurance scheme in mitigating 
withdrawal risk. 
 
 [Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Nevertheless, certain deposit insurance features can close this gap considerably. In 
particular, the difference in withdrawal rate between newly- and historically-insured respondents 
falls by 18.6 percentage points if the deposit insurance scheme covers 100% (rather than 75%) of 
eligible deposit amounts, an estimate that differs from zero at the 1% significance level. This 
estimate suggests that any deposit insurance scheme introduced during a crisis must be 
transparently generous in order to have the desired impact on withdrawal risk.  
Although our research design precludes detailed investigation, insurance scheme 
generosity may be less important when the insurance promise has imperfect credibility. We 
instruct respondents to assume that the deposit insurance provider cannot fail, but such an 
assumption has not always been borne out in practice.12 Allowing for imperfect credibility makes 
an insurance scheme less generous and so would appear likely to affect depositor behavior in a 
similar manner to greater co-insurance.  
A pre-funded deposit insurance scheme lowers the difference by a further 9.87 points 
(significant at the 5% level), a finding that is somewhat more difficult to interpret given that pre-
funding is unlikely to have any impact on the short-run attractiveness of a newly-introduced 
scheme. Nevertheless, it may reflect a belief among newly-insured respondents that holdup 
                                                 
12  The Iceland government’s default on insurance payments to foreign depositors of Landsbanki in 2008 is a notable 
example. Ennis and Keister (2009) argue that bank runs in Argentina in 2001 were partly attributable to depositor 
fears about the credibility of the government’s insurance scheme; Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) discuss 
several cases where market discipline was unaffected by the presence of deposit insurance, an outcome they attribute 
to depositor doubts about the solvency of the provider. 
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problems are less likely with such a provision. For example, an insurance scheme that is rushed 
into existence during a crisis may not seem particularly convincing to depositors who worry that 
unforeseen complications could result in payout delays. In these circumstances, the existence of 
a pre-funding provision could signal to depositors that banking administrators have devoted 
sufficient thought to the details of the new insurance scheme.  
Although less serious than bank runs in the short-term, excessive deposit interest rate 
increases have the potential to raise banks’ funding costs, with a consequent adverse effect on 
investment and general economic activity. Table 5 shows that newly-insured respondents tend to 
require a significantly higher interest premium than their historically-insured counterparts 
(coefficient estimate = 0.73; p-value < 0.01), which suggests that introducing deposit insurance 
during a crisis may be relatively ineffective in moderating funding risk.  Again, however, this 
difference is smaller for schemes with no co-insurance (coefficient estimate = -0.33; p-value = 
0.03). Also, despite requiring a higher interest premium in general, newly-insured respondents 
reveal no greater tendency towards risk-pricing than do historically-insured respondents: the 
estimated sensitivity of the interest premium to bank capital is statistically indistinguishable 
between the two groups (coefficient estimate = -0.01; p-value = 0.94). 
To the extent that funding risk may be seen as less harmful than withdrawal risk, another 
policy question of interest is the extent to which depositors can be encouraged to respond to a 
crisis by requiring higher interest rates rather than withdrawing deposits. The estimates in Table 
5 suggest there may be some scope for such response: respondents who most strongly agree with 
the risk tradeoff statement require a relatively large interest premium, but the closely-related 
respondents who most strongly agree with the risk tolerance statement withdraw relatively less 
of their deposit. Although the latter effect is economically fairly small (4.85 percentage points), 
it is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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The respondent background characteristics (other than prior exposure to deposit 
insurance) do not tend to affect the required interest premium or withdrawal rate. The one 
exception is the length of an existing bank relationship: respondents who have held an actual 
bank account for more than five years withdraw less, but also require a higher interest premium, 
than others. More familiarity with banking, it seems, breeds respect (in the sense of smaller 
withdrawals), but also some caution.13 
Finally, in untabulated analysis (but available in the SOA), we assess the in-sample 
goodness-of-fit of our model by comparing actual and predicted distributions of responses. For 
the full sample, and for the newly-insured and historically-insured subsamples, the actual and the 
predicted distributions are very similar; in no case are we able to reject the null hypothesis that 
the model provides a good fit for the data. These tests also reinforce our earlier finding of higher 
withdrawal rates among the newly-insured group of respondents. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
When a banking crisis strikes, can the belated introduction of deposit insurance help prevent 
bank runs? Our results suggest that such a policy response may only be partially successful, at 
least compared to the effectiveness of a pre-existing insurance scheme. Faced with a hypothetical 
bank failure, respondents from countries without deposit insurance indicate they would withdraw 
a greater percentage from insured accounts, and require a higher interest premium on these 
accounts, than respondents from countries with explicit deposit insurance. To some extent at 
least, more generous insurance schemes are more effective at reducing these excess withdrawal 
and funding risks.  
These results have intriguing implications for policy. Nevertheless, some caution is 
                                                 
13 Using depositor data from an Indian bank that experienced a run following the failure of a neighboring bank, Iyer 
and Puri (2012) document a similar effect. 
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advisable as our study has several limitations that should be kept in mind. First, in common with 
experimental research, our data are obtained from hypothetical situations. Actual depositors, 
faced with sharper incentives, may behave differently. This concern is potentially exacerbated by 
our use of student respondents: the combination of weak incentives and generally lower wealth, 
for example, may cause our respondents’ risk attitudes to differ from those of the depositor 
population, which could skew the estimated impact of deposit insurance. Second, our analytical 
approach necessarily simplifies the choices faced by real-world depositors. To make the analysis 
tractable, we consider only a subset of possible deposit insurance attributes, and limited variation 
in these attributes. Actual insurance systems vary much more markedly, and may affect depositor 
behavior in ways that our analysis cannot identify.  
Finally, our study leaves some interesting questions for future research. While we focus 
on the immediate reaction of depositors to news about a major bank failure, and hence on the 
short-run effectiveness of deposit insurance, an obviously important policy issue concerns the 
potential implications of a new, crisis-adopted insurance scheme for long-run moral hazard risk. 
Does the extent of depositor monitoring in such a case quickly converge to that prevailing in 
countries with long-established insurance schemes, or might there be a persistent “crisis 
dividend?” Moreover, as implied by the work of Nier and Baumann (2006), does the speed of 
such convergence depend on the level of bank competition and the generosity of the newly-
introduced insurance scheme? In addition, because our research design requires each respondent 
to answer questions in isolation from other respondents, it does not allow for social network 
effects (see Iyer and Puri, 2012; Kiss et al., 2014). To the extent that such effects can influence 
the ability of depositors to distinguish between fundamental shocks and panics, they may have 
important implications for the relative effectiveness of crisis-adopted deposit insurance. 
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Table 1 
Description of variables used to identify account and respondent characteristics 
Variable Name Description 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 1 if respondent i’s home country does not have explicit deposit insurance (0 if it does) 
Account characteristics 
High DI limit 1 if deposit insurance coverage limit is $250,000 (0 if $50,000) 
No co-insurance 1 if guaranteed payout percentage is 100% (0 if 75%) 
Large deposit 1 if deposit size exceeds the coverage limit 
Pre-funded DI 1 if bank contributes to a deposit insurance fund 
High buffer capital 1 if the level of bank’s buffer capital is above average 
Respondent characteristics 
Male 1 if respondent is male 
Bank account ≥ 5 years 1 if respondent has had an actual deposit account for 5 or more years 
Multiple bank relationships 1 if respondent has two or more additional relationships (e.g., a loan), besides the actual deposit 
account, with his or her bank 
Peer influence 1 if respondent opened his or her actual deposit account on the advice of another bank customer 
Risk tradeoff-low 1 if respondent disagrees or strongly disagrees with Risk Tradeoff statement (baseline category) 
Risk tradeoff-below average 1 if respondent somewhat disagrees with Risk Tradeoff statement 
Risk tradeoff-average 1 if respondent is neutral with respect to Risk Tradeoff statement 
Risk tradeoff-above average 1 if respondent somewhat agrees with Risk Tradeoff statement 
Risk tradeoff-high 1 if respondent agrees or strongly agrees with Risk Tradeoff statement 
Risk tolerance-low 1 if respondent disagrees or strongly disagrees with Risk Tolerance statement (baseline category) 
Risk tolerance-below average 1 if respondent somewhat disagrees with Risk Tolerance statement 
Risk tolerance-average 1 if respondent is neutral with respect to Risk Tolerance statement  
Risk tolerance-above average 1 if respondent somewhat agrees with Risk Tolerance statement 
Risk tolerance-high 1 if respondent agrees or strongly agrees with Risk Tolerance statement 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics for respondent characteristics 
Variable Full Sample Subsample: 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 0 Subsample: 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 1 Equal Proportions Test  Mean  SD  Mean  SD Mean  SD  z-statistic p-value 
Male 0.61 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.64 0.48 -0.81 0.42 
Bank relationship ≥ 5 years 0.66 0.48 0.71 0.46 0.56 0.50 2.75 0.01 
Multiple bank relationships 0.45 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.33 0.47 3.14 0.01 
Peer influence 0.28 0.45 0.24 0.42 0.38 0.49 -2.87 0.00 
Risk tradeoff-low 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.55 0.58 
Risk tradeoff-below average  0.16 0.37 0.15 0.36 0.19 0.40 -0.99 0.32 
Risk tradeoff-average 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.31 0.16 0.36 -1.33 0.18 
Risk tradeoff-above average 0.27 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.25 0.44 0.59 0.56 
Risk tradeoff-high 0.21 0.41 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.40 0.75 0.45 
Risk tolerance-low 0.31 0.46 0.28 0.45 0.37 0.48 -1.67 0.10 
Risk tolerance-below average 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.10 0.58 
Risk tolerance-average 0.18 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.38 0.32 0.75 
Risk tolerance-above average 0.16 0.36 0.18 0.39 0.10 0.31 1.91 0.06 
Risk tolerance-high 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.15 0.36 -0.86 0.39 
N 349 234 115 — 
Notes. 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 0 (1) if respondent i’s home country does (does not) have explicit deposit insurance. All variables are dummies, as defined in 
Table 1. For each variable, the final two columns report the z-statistic and corresponding p-value for the null hypothesis of equality 
between the subsamples. 
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Table 3 
Distribution of responses to interest premium question 
Response Full Sample  (%) 
Subsample: 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 0  
(%) 
Subsample: 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 1  
(%) 
1. Significantly lower 4.26 5.18 2.39 
2 9.20 10.68 6.20 
3 13.72 14.00 13.15 
4 14.90 15.33 14.02 
5 17.26 17.20 17.39 
6 15.72 15.12 16.96 
7 12.61 10.47 16.96 
8 6.81 6.30 7.83 
9. Significantly higher 3.33 2.56 4.89 
-1: Missing 2.18 3.15 0.22 
N 2,792 1,872 920 
Pearson χ2 test: χ2(9) statistic=84.16, p-value=0.00 
Notes. This table presents the distribution of responses (pooled across the eight account profiles) to the 
question “Compared to competing financial institutions, I would expect an annualized interest rate for 
this account to be…” Responses could range from significantly lower (1) to significantly higher (9).  𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 0 (1) if respondent i’s home country does (does not) have explicit deposit insurance. 
 
 
Table 4 
Distribution of responses to deposit withdrawal question 
Response Full Sample  (%) 
Subsample: 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 0  (%) Subsample: 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 1  (%) 
0% 22.67 24.20 19.57 
10% 6.91 6.89 6.96 
20% 11.32 10.90 12.17 
30% 10.78 11.06 10.22 
40% 8.42 8.76 7.72 
50% 10.85 9.99 12.61 
60% 5.30 5.40 5.11 
70% 7.56 7.16 8.37 
80% 5.73 5.24 6.74 
90% 2.72 2.78 2.61 
100% 6.66 6.09 7.83 
-1: Missing 1.07 1.55 0.11 
N  2,792 1,872  920 
Pearson χ2 test: χ2(11) statistic=30.33, p-value=0.00 
Notes. This table presents the distribution of responses (pooled across the eight account profiles) to the 
question “On hearing about the news of the shock to the financial system, what percentage of your deposit 
are you likely to immediately withdraw?” Responses could range from 0% to 100%. 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖  = 0 (1) if 
respondent i’s home country does (does not) have explicit deposit insurance. 
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Table 5 
Regression model of respondent reaction to the failure of a major domestic bank 
 Dependent Variable 
 Interest Premium Deposit Withdrawal 
Explanatory Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 0.73*** 0.18 33.62*** 7.60 
Account attributes 𝒑𝒑𝑖𝑖     
High DI limit -0.18** 0.08 -4.64 2.88 
No co-insurance -0.22** 0.09 -9.92*** 2.34 
Large deposit 0.44*** 0.06 31.66*** 2.36 
Pre-funded DI 0.02 0.09 4.76* 2.60 
High buffer capital -0.20** 0.09 -5.88* 3.51 
Interactions 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 × 𝒑𝒑𝑖𝑖      
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 × High DI limit -0.01 0.14 1.25 4.86 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 × No co-insurance -0.33** 0.15 -18.60*** 4.24 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 × Large deposit 0.02 0.12 -8.90*** 3.26 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 × Pre-funded DI -0.27 0.17 -9.87** 4.73 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 × High buffer capital -0.01 0.15 -3.94 5.50 
Respondent background characteristics 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖    
Male 0.05 0.05 -1.46 1.28 
Bank account ≥ 5 years 0.11*** 0.04 -7.30*** 1.32 
Multiple bank relationships 0.01 0.04 1.40 1.08 
Peer influence -0.02 0.05 1.93 1.18 
Risk tradeoff characteristics 𝒛𝒛𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖    
Risk tradeoff-below average -0.02 0.06   
Risk tradeoff-average -0.12* 0.06   
Risk tradeoff-above average 0.24*** 0.05   
Risk tradeoff-high 0.11** 0.05   
Risk tolerance characteristics 𝒛𝒛𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖    
Risk tolerance-below average   2.84** 1.39 
Risk tolerance-average   3.59** 1.63 
Risk tolerance-above average   -0.68 1.58 
Risk tolerance-high   -4.85*** 1.75 
Latent interest premium   1.16 4.56 
Latent interest premium × 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖   -4.55*** 1.48 
Constant 1.76*** 0.28 25.34*** 8.26 
Notes. This table presents the estimated system described by Eqs. (3) and (4): 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ =  𝜃𝜃𝜋𝜋 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 +  𝒑𝒑𝑖𝑖′ ∙ 𝜶𝜶𝜋𝜋 +  𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝒑𝒑𝑖𝑖′ ∙ 𝜷𝜷𝜋𝜋 +  𝒛𝒛𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖′ ∙ 𝜸𝜸𝜋𝜋 +  𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖′ ∙ 𝜿𝜿𝜋𝜋  +  𝜆𝜆𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ =  𝜃𝜃𝑤𝑤 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 +  𝒑𝒑𝑖𝑖′ ∙ 𝜶𝜶𝑤𝑤 +  𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝒑𝒑𝑖𝑖′ ∙ 𝜷𝜷𝑤𝑤  +  𝒛𝒛𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖′ ∙ 𝜸𝜸𝑤𝑤 +  𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖′ ∙ 𝜿𝜿𝑤𝑤+ 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ∙ 𝛿𝛿𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
where 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  is the latent interest premium, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  is the latent deposit withdrawal percentage, 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖  = 0 (1) if 
respondent i’s home country does (does not) have explicit deposit insurance, and 𝛿𝛿𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿𝑤𝑤 + ∆𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖. See Table 
1 for other variable definitions. Statistical significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each equation also 
includes dummies for risk-adjusted, and compulsory bank participation in, deposit insurance, but these are 
suppressed to conserve space as they have little effect on the two dependent variables. The number of 
observations for each of the two dependent variables is 2,792 (349 responses to eight questions). 
 
